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Epilogue:                                   
Translating Experience into Biomedical 
Assemblages. Observations on European 
Forms of ( Imagined) Participatory Agency 
in Healthcare 
STEFAN BECK
The following pages cannot rightfully claim to be an epi-logue – 
rather, they are attempting something akin to an aside-logue to 
the issues analysed in this book. Instead of focusing on practi-
ces of health promotion per se, the article sets out to begin thin-
king about what could be called the »reflexive consequences« of 
a promotional health care approach; it aims at a partial view of 
the reception-end of health care promotion. What do those 
people who are ›health promoted‹ think and do? How do they 
perceive medicine, medical experts and prevention program-
mes? What do they expect from the medical system and what 
do they attempt to change? I will neither attempt to provide a 
comparative perspective on modes of participation of patients in 
diverse European medical systems, nor will I systematically dis-
sect the complex relations of biomedical assemblages, biomedi-
cal citizenships, participatory regimes, new forms of subjectifi-
cation, medical governance, and antagonistic as well as cooper-
ative modes of knowledge production in the transaction zone 
between medical and patient expertise; these topics were taken 
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up by the articles in this book. Instead, I will suggest some 
hypotheses, providing some rather pointillistic evidence and 
food for thought. I will use empirical findings of a multisited 
research project funded by the European Union1 to look into 
how patients and »concerned people« perceive biomedicine 
and the ethical challenges that come with new regimes of 
medical intervention.  
Specifically, I will argue that the concept of health promo-
tion, as it is commonly applied in public health programmes, is 
hampered by an unidirectional concept of in-formation: an 
understanding where abstract medical knowledge is set in 
motion by experts to transform the lives and practices of non-
experts that are considered to be »not in the know«. As a 
consequence, most health interventions do not actively attempt 
to systematically integrate experiences of patients and non-
experts into their programmes – resulting in a systematic unrefle-
xivity. However, patients and the »targets« of health services 
can try to mobilise their experiences in an attempt to translate 
their knowledge back into biomedical assemblages, thereby ma-
king healthcare more reflexive. The conclusion of the following 
argument is simple: to make preventive health policies more 
reflexive, a relational concept is needed that focuses on a bi-
directional translation of experience and knowledge between health 
experts and patients/concerned people. 
My multi-layered hypothesis will consist firstly of a critique 
of the critique of medicalisation; secondly of the proposal that 
we are witnessing a de-socialisation of medicine due to the in-
tensification of collaborations with other life-sciences, and third-
ly the suggestion that attempts to re-socialise medicine via 
novel routes are well under way, for example by subjecting 
medicine to trials of accountability or economic interests. I will 
present some empirical material of how the respondents of the 
aforementioned research project confront the boundaries of 
medicine, and finally I will portray some exemplary zones of 
                                             
1  The project »Challenges of Biomedicine« (EU Project no. SAS6-
CT-2003-510238), coordinated by Ulrike Felt in Vienna (Dept. of 
Social Studies of Science); see the website for participating 
researchers, institutions, research design and a brief summary of 
main findings: http://www.univie.ac.at/virusss/cobpublication. 
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engagement where patients are trying to translate their ex-
periences into the medical assemblage.  
From medical isat ion to biomedical isat ion 
The dominant critique of western medicine is the critique of 
medicalisation, a word used to denote – in the words of sociolo-
gist Irving Zola – that in modernity »more and more of every-
day life has come under medical dominion, influence and su-
pervision« (Zola 1983: 295). However, this critique hinders a 
sufficiently complex analysis of recent developments in the 
production and application of medical knowledge. To its 
followers, medicalisation signifies a process in which a medical 
frame or definition is applied to understand or manage a pro-
blem. Well-known examples include the founding of medical 
institutions such as birth-houses in which poor women had to 
give birth under medically controlled conditions, or the recent 
emergence of new syndromes like Attention Deficit/Hy-
peractivity Disorder that define a complex behavioural pheno-
menon as caused by neurological states. Specifically, medicalisa-
tion describes a process of social control in which phenomena, 
formerly understood to be non-medical or even non-problema-
tic, »become defined and treated as medical problems, usually 
in terms of illnesses or disorders« (Conrad 1992: 209).2 More 
often than not, medicalisation is understood to be a linear 
process unfolding in modernity parallel and connected to to 
secularisation.  
However, the theorem of medicalisation, while affording a 
powerful critique of the medical system, creates considerable 
blind spots. The most prominent of these allows changes in the 
composition of medical knowledges and the logics of medical 
practices to be played down in a perspective that privileges the 
analysis of unchanging and stable power asymmetries between 
science and everyday life-worlds. In particular, the ongoing 
                                             
2  Early studies in medicalisation processes in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s took their inspiration in part from Talcott Parsons 
(1951), who was »probably the first to conceptualize medicine as 
an institution of social control« (Conrad 1992: 210). 
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biomedicalization (Clarke, Shim et al. 2003) of medical know-
ledges and practices themselves, including the complex effects 
of the converging knowledges of molecular biology, genetics, 
biochemics, information sciences and mathematics, has revolu-
tionised the epistemic basis of medicine. In addition to this, the 
»institutional sites of health-care knowledge production, distri-
bution, and information management« (ibid: 162) are being re-
made, and a complex, internationally networked system is emer-
ging that consists of hospitals, clinical research, research group 
practices, pharmaceutical research and development, health-
care management organisations, bioscientific and medical 
technologies, and supplies industries. One would expect that 
any analysis of this complex network would take into consider-
ation power asymmetries that go far beyond a simple 
science/life-world divide as is suggested by the trope of medi-
calisation. Instead of taking the linear process of medicine 
expanding to other domains for granted, one should – follow-
ing Donna Haraway and others – instead try to achieve a better 
understanding of the potentiality and dynamics created by the 
inherent hybridity of the medical system and its multiple trans-
action zones (see Beck and Niewöhner 2006) that are the out-
come of multiple resistances – be they material, political, 
economical or social. 
Such a perspective would also shed some light on the effects 
of the pervasive neo-liberal reforms of medical systems in in-
dustrialised societies, which have since the 1980s reconfigured 
medicine beyond recognition. Both the substance and form of 
doing medicine have been thoroughly transformed in recent 
years. The interfaces between medicine and society have been 
reassembled, as were the forms and the modes of domination, 
influence and supervision that medicine could sustain or aspire 
to command. In consequence, new social transaction zones – 
between public/private, government/corporation; expert/lay, 
patient/consumer; physician/insurer; and university/indu-
stry/state, as well as new, related ways to »know and take care 
of thyself« have come into being. In the words of Adele Clarke 
and colleagues, historians of medicine: »we see new forms of 
agency, empowerment, confusion, resistance, responsibility, 
docility, subjugation, citizenship, subjectivity, and morality« 
(Clarke, Shim et al. 2003: 185). Indeed, these are »zones of 
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awkward engagement« (Tsing 2004: xi) that provide »infinite 
new sites of negotiation, percolations of power, alleviations as 
well as instigations of suffering, and the emergence of here-
tofore subjugated knowledges and new social and cultural 
forms.« (Clarke, Shim et al. 2003: 185). 
The desocia l isat ion of  medicine? 
The combined impact of the medicalisation critique from the 
outside and the growing Verwissenschaftlichung – »scientifi-
cation« – of medical practices through their intense collabora-
tion with biology and genetics3 has led to an increasing dis-
engagement on the part of medical practitioners with the social
and cultural issues of illness and individual suffering and, more 
generally, with the lives of patients in their respective social 
contexts. 
This alienation is of course also due to a growing 
epistemological, i.e. methodological and theoretical and institutional
gap between the new biomedicalised medicine and the social 
sciences. From its foundation by Émile Durkheim or Max 
Weber in the early 20th century, sociological theory building has 
always privileged a resolutely anti-naturalistic explanatory 
strategy: an understanding of the »social« as the causal order in 
its own right was a cornerstone in the foundation of the new 
discipline. The dichotomy suggested by Wilhelm Dilthey (1923) 
between Erklären und Verstehen – between explaining natural 
phenomena and understanding social and mental phenomena – 
strengthened this anti-naturalism in the humanities and the so-
cial sciences. As the sociologist Ted Benton (2005) argues, this 
rift only grew in the 20th century as a result of recurrent at-
tempts of biologists to extend the range of their explanatory 
claims to the social – be it sociobiology or evolutionary psy-
chology. In both cases, the social appeared only as a rather un-
interesting epiphenomenon of fascinating biological processes – 
namely of mutation and selection on the genetic level. Accor-
ding to Benton, this powerful – but nonetheless unrefined – re-
                                             
3  Clarke et al. (2003) call this process »the technoscientization of 
biomedicine«. 
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ductionism appalled social scientists and resulted in a systema-
tic avoidance of research into physiological phenomena.  
As I see it, we are currently witnessing the outcome of a 
dual »disengagement«: the new biomedicine is disengaging 
from the social, the social sciences are disengaging from the 
natural. Whatever the reasons, the result is, on the one hand, a 
marked decline in an interest in social causes of medical conditions
and physiological effects of particular life-worlds, such as living social 
inferiority (Charlesworth, Gilfillan et al. 2004). On the other 
hand, a growing lack of enthusiasm for life-world interventions 
has developed, a disinclination to guide patients from illness-
experience to restored health. In sharp contrast to this disengage-
ment, good old paternalistic medicine, while at the same time 
trying to medicalise phenomena had to boldly intervene into the 
life-worlds of their patients. This necessarily meant that they 
had to develop a much clearer picture of what it meant to be ill 
socially and culturally. Consequently, old-fashioned medicine in 
the traditions of Rudolf Virchow, Louis Pasteur and Robert 
Koch was highly attentive to environmental effects and life-
world phenomena that had pathogenic effects or hindered 
salutogenesis.  
But the biomedicalization of medicine led not only to a 
desocializing of medical practices. The increased intermingling of 
medical knowledge production with other life-sciences subjec-
ted clinical medicine to processes that were more characteristic 
of the experimental sciences (Gieryn 1999; Stengers and Smith 
2000). As Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer put it: modern 
scientific knowledge became »a form of knowledge that is the 
most open in principle [but] has become the most closed in 
practice (Shapin and Schaffer 1985: 336). The historical closure 
of scientific epistemic cultures has not only meant the exclusion 
of charlatans and the untrained public or a defence against 
normative trespassing from religious and worldly authorities; 
most of all it has involved the construction of robust objects of 
inquiry. However, medicine’s epistemic object, the body, is 
peculiar in being an irreducibly dual or ambiguous entity. On 
the one hand there is the scientific, universal object-body known 
through the pathological gaze from the outside, but on the other 
hand there is the embodied subject-body, »the fleshy situatedness 
of our modes of living« (Mol and Law 2004: 43) that is beyond 
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or before language, that is self-aware and socially performed and 
that accordingly involves completely different modes of 
knowing, incompatible with objectivist epistemic practices. The 
classic solution invented by medicine for dealing with this 
duality – suggested, for example, as early as 1902 by the Polish 
philosopher of medicine Edmund Biernacki – is a sort of multi-
ple identity. According to this description, two types of medical 
practices are to be distinguished: (A) the »science of diseases«, 
i.e. physiology and pathology, and (B) the »art of healing«, i.e. 
therapeutic, highly individualised interventions into self-aware, 
reflexive bodies, where the patient-doctor interaction becomes 
central (Biernacki 2000: 49). Mark Sullivan – and with him 
many medical anthropologists, medical sociologists and a 
growing number of medical practitioners – argues that this 
dualism between the object-body known by modern medicine 
and the self-aware subject-body can be overcome by integrating 
people’s self-awareness back into modern medicine (Sullivan 
1986). The utopia here is an integrated, holistic body concept 
(Harrington 2002). 
Transforming modern medicine will not come overnight: as 
Annemarie Mol and John Law convincingly argue, any attempt 
to simply add the patient’s self-awareness to knowledge resul-
ting from the systematic application of the clinical or epi-
demiological gaze will be futile. Biomedical epistemic practices 
prevent the social from entering the house of medical know-
ledge through the front door. However, the social loiters 
around at the back door, waiting for unexpected and often 
nasty appearances – in instances of failed compliance, in psy-
chosomatic disorders, or in the biosocial looping effects 
described by Ian Hacking and others. In all these cases, the 
social makes itself »visible« in a mode that medicine is only able 
to reflect upon as disturbances of established thought-styles, as 
disruptions of routine medical practices that have to be 
eliminated. Any truly integrative approach would instead 
require a thorough re-conceptualisation of the medical object 
and of medical practices that acknowledges socially embedded 
bodies. The impressive growth of biomedical knowledge and 
the success of etiological model-building in recent years do not 
exactly help to convince medical practitioners or researchers to 
re-conceptualise their object of study. The price to be paid for 
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this negligence will unfortunately be a sustained ignorance of 
the socio-cultural dimensions of health and disease. The issue at 
hand, then, is to investigate the mechanisms that could bring 
social context back to medicine and make embodied selves 
visible to medical practitioners and researchers.  
Re-socia l ising medicine via   
accountabi l i ty tr ia ls? 
Although the socio-cultural dimension has been muted, other 
facets of the »social« are increasingly impacting scientific 
practices through the side-doors. We find a growing entangle-
ment of industry and state-funded research, especially in the 
sector of the life sciences. Emblematic for this interpenetration 
is the 25-million-dollar sponsoring deal that was supposed to 
give Novartis almost complete control over the Berkeley 
Biology Department in 2000, or the fact that researchers are 
switching back and forth between corporate and university 
labs. Another route of social influence into university research 
is the reformulation of property rights and their expansion into 
new phenomena that were not proprietary before, such as 
»naturally occurring« proteins or gene sequences. This not only 
introduced market rationality into the context of basic research 
at universities, but opened up the possibility for mergers be-
tween risk-capital and innovative ideas at the bench. As the 
sociologist of science Peter Weingart (2001) observes, the result 
is a double dynamics of an »academisation« of industrial re-
search and a growing commercialisation of academic research 
in the field of the life sciences. Accordingly, it is increasingly 
difficult to demarcate sites of knowledge production from sites 
of knowledge application and research decisions from econo-
mic decisions – a demarcation that is crucial for the dearly held 
definition of what »science« is and what it is not (Stengers and 
Smith 2000).  
What is of interest to me in the context of this paper is that 
these phenomena, (A) what I have described as the tendency 
towards the de-socialisation of medicine, as well as (B) the 
growing integration of economic rationalities and monetary 
»interests« into scientific practices, are both perceived to create 
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accountability problems from the perspective of health care po-
licies and health care consumers. The notion of accountability 
includes the application of moral as well as economic reasoning 
and stands for an arsenal of bureaucratic instruments and 
institutionalised expectations (Strathern 2000). What makes 
questions of »accountability« interesting from an anthropolo-
gical point of view is that they shape subjects and objects in a 
specific way, and this way applies to all players in the field. For 
example, by looking at doctor-patient relationships through the 
lens of accountability, three patterns emerge: the patient in need, 
the citizen entitled with rights or some sort of amalgamated 
patient-citizen (see Sang 2004). 
From object  to  subject  of  care? 
The discussions about the draft for an European Charter of 
Patients’ Rights are an example of where the »social« audibly 
knocks at the door of medicine, using accountability as the 
knocker: the charter defines fourteen patients’ rights, seeking to 
»guarantee a ›high level of human health protection‹ […], to as-
sure the high quality of services provided by the various health 
services […] throughout the entire territory of the European 
Union« (Network 2002). The European draft Charter is based 
on the French Charter for hospital patients, that states: »Le 
patient hospitalisé n’est pas seulement un malade. Il est avant 
tout une personne avec des droits et des devoirs.« (Circulaire 
ministérielle n° 95-22 du 6 mai 1995). The Charter attempts 
nothing less than to subject biomedicine and health care 
institutions, be they private or public, clinical work or research, 
to Article 35 of the Nice Charter of Fundamental Rights, framing
medicine as a dependent subsystem of society. This is the anti-
thesis of the self-image of science understood as a truth-
producing container shielded from society as described by 
Shapin and Schaffer. Interestingly enough, Part Three of the 
draft Charter defines the »rights of active citizenship«, which 
include the right of citizens to perform »auditing and verifi-
cation activities« in the European health care systems, as well as 
the right to participate in policy-making in the area of health. In 
short, the Charter tries to develop a route suitable for making 
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parts of the subject-body known to medicine, that is to say: it 
uses the instruments of accountability trials to translate the 
patients’ points of view, desires and needs into the biomedical 
assemblage. 
The Charter is, however, characterised by a specific ambi-
valence. Although it explicitly tries to strengthen the role of 
patient associations in monitoring the performance of health 
care systems and setting research agendas, the language of 
individual rights is used throughout the document and the core 
idea of protecting the autonomy of patients accentuates the 
concept of the individual as a consumer of health products. 
Combined with the implementation of bureaucratic instru-
ments of accountability that require well-defined deliverables, a 
standardisation of health interventions as well as a formalisa-
tion of patient-doctor relations might be a rather unintended 
consequence. The highly standardised »informed consent 
forms« could serve as a model in this regard. Despite the best 
intentions, they do not primarily produce informed patients: 
instead, they mainly serve to protect physicians against redress 
and litigation. Given these prospects, a recent intervention of 
the European Ombudsman, political scientist Nikiforos Dia-
mandouros, is relevant. He distinguishes between two models 
of doctor-patient relationship that are based on two different 
ideas of »what equality and autonomy should mean« 
(Diamandouros 2005: 7). Diamandouros calls the first model 
»consumerist and depicts it as influenced by the American 
model, which tries to compensate for the inequality of know-
ledge and expertise of patients and physicians by supplying full 
information and giving patients unconstrained choice. The 
alternative model, termed »communicative« and which is his 
ideal »European model – if I interpret the Ombudsman correct-
ly – does not try to overcome power asymmetries between 
patient and physician through a flow of medical knowledge. 
Instead, it uses this asymmetry as a resource by considering the 
patient as an »autonomous agent making choices about one’s 
own life« who is in need of information, advice and even 
guidance (Mol 2008).  
What is remarkable in the context of my argument is that 
the communicative model of the doctor-patient relationship 
which does not presuppose a virtual equality provides a much 
EPILOGUE
205
better transaction zone for the exchange of experiential 
knowledge – be it the patient’s or the physician’s – than the 
consumerist model. This product-oriented model claims to se-
cure power-equality through informational transparency, and is 
therefore restricted to formalised exchanges. It is obvious that 
these are idealised models; our question was how our respon-
dents in the mentioned research project perceived these issues.  
For the moment, let me take up the issue of »interests« 
again. The aforementioned demarcation between pure, disinter-
ested, truth-producing science on the one hand and the 
normatively spoilt, interest-driven life-world on the otherhas 
never been very convincing, either theoretically or empirically. 
Even in the 1930s, Robert Merton pointed out the intricate 
interdependence between social institutions in modernity – be 
it science, the military, economy, or religion – which culminated 
in the dynamic development of the industrial-military-scientific 
complex of the 20th century (Merton 1973). What has to be 
explained, then, is why the ideal of a disinterested scientific 
practice is upheld against the overwhelming evidence. Niklas 
Luhmann suggests that the classic theoretical exclusion of 
interests from epistemic practices in science established a 
contrafactual ideal that nevertheless served as an important 
means of quality control in the production of objective truths. 
Following this ideal, experimental data and the knowledge 
created from it are not ascribed to acts – since acts are per 
definitionem always contaminated by individual interests, mo-
tives and emotions. Instead, scientific knowledge is attributed 
to experience that is conceived of as being independent from 
individual actors and their specific interests: it is attributed to 
factors external to the social.  
Accordingly, Luhmann suggests that any sociology of 
knowledge production has to stick to the paradoxical operation 
of including the acts of exclusion of interests from their field of 
study into their observations. More precisely, he suggests 
closely observing how the exclusion and inclusion of interests 
in systems of knowledge production are »managed« and to 
what extent the potentially »contaminating« contexts of scienti-
fic practice are taken into account (Luhmann 1990). Central for 
my argument here are two points: firstly, the decisive role 
experience plays as the foundation for truth claims in science. I 
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argue that members of patient associations invoke their experi-
ence as sufferers not only to make moral claims but to use it as a 
powerful mode of claiming the truth. The second point is a 
mirror image of the first: by criticising the fact that interests 
foreign to science are gaining importance, patients assess 
biomedicine in front of the backdrop of the idealised, powerful 
image of »pure science« in order to de-legitimise new know-
ledge practices. I will now present a selection of empirical 
material in which our respondents bring all of these problems 
into play at once. 
Confront ing the boundar ies  
of  ( impure)  science 
The following exchange is from a focus group discussion of 
seven participants »affected« in some way or another by genetic 
testing, either as patients or as experienced experts.4 The inter-
change develops between a female general practitioner, a male 
prostate cancer patient, and a male Crohn’s disease patient, 
both of whom are leaders of self-help groups. Referring to her 
medical training in the early 1990s, the general practitioner 
asserts:  
»back then [the expression] ›support group‹ was an insult amongst 
doctors. And now, if I think about the last months of my residency, 
when I worked a lot with neurologists […], they only worked with 
support groups. They have, that was an extension [i.e.: they used it for 
their purposes, S. B.].« 
The leader of the Prostate Cancer Support Group, however, 
cautions:  
»There are many support groups, and no quality criteria, [there are 
groups] that are initiated by medical staff, as well as by doctors, [there 
are groups] that are initiated by pharmaceutical companies…‹ 
The Leader of the Crohn’s patient group (cutting in): ›…We have also 
realised that some doctors shamelessly abuse support groups, because 
                                             
4  This focus group discussion was facilitated in the context of the 
aforementioned EU project (see footnote 1). 
EPILOGUE
207
they find out […] where there are really good people, dedicated people, 
they send them all to support groups, because it is too much for them, 
right.‹ 
The general practitioner: ›No, but it is clear, you are the experts. Yes.‹ 
The Crohn’s disease patient: ›Exactly, and that’s exactly what I want to 
say.‹ 
The general practitioner: ›Now […] as that we as doctors have finally 
understood that, that you are the experts, and if we finally […] want to 
collaborate with you, then you are surprised (laughing).‹« (focus group 
discussion) 
The Crohn’s disease patient adds what he sees as the prevailing 
mind-set of many physicians:  
»what we as physicians are simply not able to do anymore, we give it to 
the support group and they should [do it].« (focus group discussion) 
In this brief and very cordial exchange, there are a number of 
topics that recur throughout the empirical material and are of 
central concern to my hypotheses. First of all, all participants 
here claim that medical practitioners use patient groups for the 
delivery of emotional support, psychological stabilisation and 
individualised or even basic medical information. The reasons 
are not quite clear, but changing work conditions on the part of 
physicians as well as a lack of interest and training in socio-
psychological issues are clearly alluded to. From the perspec-
tive of the leaders of the two patient groups, this constellation is 
partially experienced as abuse – it is seen as an unfair delegation 
of responsibilities from experts to volunteers that is clearly over-
taxing the strained resources of these insufficiently funded 
groups. But here as well as in other exchanges the picture 
created by participants is more complex. Recurrent references 
are made to »sponsored« support groups that are financially 
dependent or even founded by pharmaceutical companies, the 
medical profession or research institutions. The work of these 
groups is observed with circumspection and even suspicion. 
But the three mentioned discussants fully agree that the 
social unresponsiveness of the medical system (or to be more 
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precise: the indifference of physicians) is not easily overcome 
by the activities of patient groups. Many of our respondents see 
the reason of this unresponsiveness and the lack of accounta-
bility to patients’ needs as proof that science is becoming 
increasingly »impure«, spoiled with interests that are foreign to 
medicine proper. Perhaps we shouldn’t wonder: our respon-
dents are members of liberal societies, predisposed to the view 
that the public good is maximised by giving the whole range of 
legitimate individual interests the chance of being pursued. To 
them, the idea of strengthening patient rights or involving 
patient groups in the policy process appears to be a clever fix of 
corporate domination in the medical field. 
Quite contrary to the hopes of its proponents, it seems that 
these voluntary activities may well widen the gap between 
medicine and the life-world: according to the accounts quoted 
above, medical practitioners seem only too happy that patient 
groups shoulder the burdensome work of providing infor-
mation, integration and political representation to individual 
sufferers. This should caution against viewing the proliferation 
of patient groups and the current, widespread demand for 
participatory policies in the domain of health care and medical re-
search simply as a sign of progress and democratisation. As 
already argued before, the demand for patient rights is a 
response to the ongoing biomedicalisation and de-socialisation 
of health care, but a response that might be likely to para-
doxically advance this dynamics.  
The second central issue in the exchanges of the focus group 
discussions is the question of expertise – what it is and who can 
legitimately claim the status of being an expert. What is 
probably most striking in going through the material of focus 
group discussions and interviews is the profound scepticism, 
the disappointment and to some extent even the animosity that 
respondents who have experienced genetic testing or organ 
transplantation articulate when asked about their evaluation of 
physicians and the performance of the medical system. Accor-
ding to our respondents, there are several major problems that 
– if the statements are carefully interpreted – are perceived as 
caused by specific constellations of Erkenntnis und Interesse – of 
knowledge/cognition and interest. Our respondents perceive a 
pervasive hybridity of epistemic formations that is not congruent 
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with established self-promotions and public expectations of 
scientific practices as truth-oriented and neutral. At issue here 
is the interpenetration of economy, politics and science I 
mentioned earlier.5 What we gather from our material is a 
snapshot of how the debates about science, the popularised 
findings of science and technology studies and the recent scan-
dals in the field of science have shaped civic perceptions of 
scientific practice. A short exchange in a French focus group of 
not affected participants about the potential role of citizens’ 
committees in policy making is representative of this view, 
which understands science as a form of situated practice: 
A middle-aged male artist: ›[…] governments are subjected to lobbies. 
Right, well, lobbies are pursuing their interests, and the […] experts 
have links because, to be an expert, you have to have been shaped in the mould, 
by the networks, relationships with labs … No, personally I can see […] that 
[the advice of] citizens' committees […] would be as valid […] and in 
any case more independent than that of experts, or governments, or I 
don't know. [A small remark by another speaker, then he continues] 
And [we] could force experts to speak under oath, with checks and a 
non-commutable sentence if they lied.‹ 
A middle aged female teacher: That really shows all the trust we have in 
our institutions!‹ 
The artist again: ›Absolutely [laughs]. And in this case, I'm old enough
to be able to judge. Don't you agree?‹« (focus group discussion)6
Emerging from this and many similar accounts is a rather ba-
lanced picture, far off from the worst expectations of the anti-
constructivist defenders of science. Instead, it is quite a sober 
observation that to be an expert means that one has to be shaped 
in the mould, that one has to be part of a community of practice that 
positions every scientist in a social field that conditions his rele-
vancies, perspectives, decisions and actions. The view of our 
                                             
5  To put it bluntly: If you ever were guessing – according to our 
material, the constructivists won the science wars of the 1990s in 
the public vote. 
6  This French focus group was facilitated by Anne Masseran and 
Philippe Chavot in Marseille (see footnote 1). 
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discussants is generally constructivist, not in the vulgar »any-
thing goes«-sense but in a partially enlightened sense, fully 
compatible with their own everyday experiences, that their 
minds and deeds are shaped by economic, political and cultural 
conditions. While most of our respondents do not question 
science per se and hope that they might eventually profit from 
scientific progress, they do not have faith in the biomedical system
that pursues specific paths of progress, trying to maximise 
profits for its practitioners. Lacking trust in institutions is the 
trope most often used to discuss this perceived tension between 
the ideal of science and its institutionalised forms. 
The critique of the performance of the biomedical system is 
grimmer when affected respondents review scientific practices. 
They assess biomedicine not only as interested practice but quite 
fundamentally as a specific form of knowledge practice that is 
only partially fit to do its job. According to the evaluation of our 
respondents who have had experiences with genetic testing or 
organ transplantation, there are three problems related to 
dominant biomedical knowledge practices: (A) respondents 
provided us with a plethora of anecdotes where insufficient, 
misleading, or even false information was given to patients. 
According to these accounts, physicians as the first, crucial 
point of contact with the biomedical system lack factual 
knowledge, either because science develops too quickly to keep 
up-to-date with the latest findings as a professional under the 
constant pressure of work, or because the problems are too 
complex to be dealt with by experts that received only a highly 
specialised training. (B) Most physicians are seen to lack 
emotional knowledge, so that they are not able or willing to cope 
with the existential problems of their patients, especially if 
these are confronted with the diagnosis of a potentially deadly 
or chronic disease. Finally, (C) biomedical experts are judged to 
lack experiential knowledge of what it means to cope with a 
severe illness that demands therapeutic interventions and 
confronts issues of stigmatisation on a daily basis.  
While those of our respondents who had no specific prior 
experiences with genetic testing or organ donation mostly 
stated that they more or less trusted the medical system, those 
who did have prior experiences as patients often expressed am-
bivalent feelings about the reliability of the medical system and 
EPILOGUE
211
its practitioners. They have no alternative to trust while they have 
many reasons to be sceptical. The following quote is from a female 
respondent from Germany, aged 32, who is suffering from an 
inherited cardiomyopathy and is on the waiting list for a heart 
transplantation. Note that she uses the impersonal German 
»man« (one) to distance herself from her mixed feelings: 
»In any case, I want to have confidence in the domain of medicine, in all 
the little steps that happen, but one has somehow lost it. One gets more 
careful, I have to say. Beginning with the little things, with a stay at the 
hospital. If you are in several hospitals, you already see differences: how 
it works here, how it works there, there I’m much, much better, there 
they gave me this and that pill, here they actually talked to me and there 
nobody talked to me at all. Well, all this is varies a lot. Or this feeling – 
at the … cardiologist’s I wait for 3 hours, they give me an appointment 
at 3 p.m. and it’s my turn at 7 p.m. There I say to myself: hello, I’m not 
well, can I be the next one please? And then it’s the private patients’ 
turn before me, of course, I’m just – let me have it this way – an unglam-
orous health plan patient. You lose confidence at some point. […] that’s 
what I think. It’s just – well, real trust – I don’t know.« (patient 
interview)7  
In analysing the issues of trust and expertise that are recurrent 
in our interviews and focus group discussions, some differen-
tiations made by the sociologist Anthony Giddens might be 
helpful. For Giddens, modernity is generally characterised by 
all-encompassing abstract systems. These abstract systems 
emerge when social relations are moved from direct, local inter-
actions of co-present actors to increasingly indirect, distanced, 
abstract interactions. Giddens terms this process the dis-
embedding of social relations. One of the most powerful dis-
embedding mechanisms in the development of modern insti-
tutions is the establishment of expert systems. These expert sys-
tems, according to Giddens, arrange technical accomplishments 
and professional expertise that in turn organise the »material 
and social environments in which we live today« (Giddens, 
Consequences, 27). And again Giddens:  
                                             
7  This interview was conducted by Katrin Amelang in the context 
of the EU project (see footnote 1). 
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»Most laypersons consult ›professionals‹ – lawyers, architects, doctors, 
and so forth – only in a periodic or irregular fashion. But the systems in 
which the knowledge of experts is integrated influence many aspects of 
what we do in a continuous way. Simply by sitting in my house, I am in-
volved in an expert system, or a series of such systems, in which I place 
my reliance. I have no particular fear in going upstairs in the dwelling, 
even though I know that in principle the structure might collapse. I 
know very little about the codes of knowledge used by the architect and 
the builder in the design and construction of the home, but I nonetheless 
have ›faith‹ in what they have done. My ›faith‹ is not so much in them, 
although I have to trust their competence, as in the authenticity of the 
expert knowledge which they apply« (Giddens 1990: 27f.) 
Giddens’ differentiation of trust in the system and faith in the 
internal workings of expert systems provides a valuable insight 
because it affords a perspective on power and knowledge that 
is highly relevant for the patients’ perspectives of the medical 
system. For Giddens, the prime condition for trust is the in-
escapable lack of full information; accordingly all trust in expert 
systems is necessarily blind trust. This trust derives from faith in 
the reliability of principles, procedures and self-control 
mechanisms applied in expert systems of which the trusting 
person in general is ignorant.  
»In conditions of modernity, attitudes of trust towards abstract systems 
are usually routinely incorporated into the continuity of day-to-day acti-
vities and are to a large extent enforced by the intrinsic circumstances of 
daily life. Thus trust is […] a tacit acceptance of circumstances in which 
other alternatives are largely foreclosed.« (Giddens 1990: 90) 
As our interviews and the focus group discussions make clear, 
while valuing science as a truth-producing expert system and a 
herald of progress, the nuanced opinions of our respondents 
have two sources. Firstly, the faith in the correctness of 
procedures and the application of knowledge is often challen-
ged at the »access points« of the medical system, where our re-
spondents interacted with concrete physicians or were ›con-
suming‹ health care. These are reactions to perceived malpractice
or unresponsiveness on the part of physicians. But there are also 
effects of close encounters with science as a system of multiple, 
competing and even conflicting knowledges. As in the case of 
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the cardiomyopathy patient, science is revealed as an exercise 
in generalised scepticism of its own products – and this is the 
second, more fundamental source of uncertainty. 
Exper iencing /  Knowing –  Intersect ions and 
zones of  awkward engagement  
In response to this twofold lack of confidence brought about by 
close encounters with the medical system, many of our 
respondents seek the help of patient groups. There they are 
looking for a special type of experiential knowledge that medical 
professionals – as they perceive it – are not able to provide. The 
statement of a male focus-group discussant from Germany, 
who received a heart-transplant four years ago, is an exemplary 
case; he describes how he hunted for information after the 
physicians of the Berlin Heart Center had put him on the 
transplant waiting list:  
»the doctors are the specialists, right, but they just don’t have the time 
to talk to you for hours on end. And above all, they haven’t experienced 
[a heart transplantation] themselves. So there … was this [names an 
association of organ transplant recipients] and I went [to one of] the 
regular meetings. So there I went, met the colleague [… and he] told me 
everything. He even came to my house to see me there. And ever since 
it has been much more easy for me. Enormously easy, you know. I 
received a lot of support there.« (focus group discussion8) 
In their analysis of the Association Française Contre les Myopathies
(AMF), Vololona Rabeharisoa and Michel Callon (2004) de-
scribe two crucial functions of patient groups: they serve as de-
vices for – as they call it – the »primitive accumulation of know-
ledge« and as sites for »mutual learning«: experienced patients 
not only give emotional support and basic information to fellow 
sufferers, they also accumulate knowledge, for example about 
individual reactions to treatments, about side-effects or first-
hand data about the course of diseases. Because many of these 
patient-groups are devoted to rare diseases of which clinical 
                                             
8  This focus group discussion was facilitated by Silke Schicktanz in 
Berlin (see footnote 1). 
STEFAN BECK  
214
medicine – not only because of the small patient numbers – has 
no sufficient knowledge, patients and their associations are 
likely to collect data that has the potential »to enhance the effi-
ciency of medical services. […] patients and their association[s] 
are the origin of numerous documents on the effects of drugs, 
and readily discuss such issues with specialists« (ibid., p. 147f), 
often as equals. A similar success story can be told of the 
German Retinitis Pigmentosa Society, founded in the late 1970s, 
which – like the AMF – managed to organise dispersed and 
fragmented research efforts in different disciplines and loca-
tions to serve their purposes. Besides collecting funds for 
research grants, the Society also influenced research through 
organising patients and making them »accessible« for resear-
chers – by distributing questionnaires among its members or 
even by organised donations of tissue-samples with which to 
experiment (Gizycki 1987). More examples could be added, 
such as the impact of ACT UP, the US-American AIDS Coalition 
to Unleash Power, on AIDS research and treatment (Epstein 
1996), or the US-American National Marfan Foundation that 
chose to pursue more »modest interventions« into research 
decisions (Heath 1997). 
In front of the backdrop of these success stories, not only 
limited to industrialised countries, it comes as no surprise that 
neo-liberal health care policy makers found the figure of the 
expert patient to be an ideal actor: he or she accumulates valua-
ble knowledge in support of better science, is actively involved 
in his or her treatment, provides support to other sufferers, and 
can be enrolled in enhancing the accountability of the health 
system through a critical evaluation of the services offered to 
him.9 As a recent Canadian study on citizen-participation in 
health care argues, this new role attributed to the expert patient
also reflects a growing recognition on the part of policy makers 
»that many decisions in health care involve both clinical and 
value choices« (Department of Health 2001). This expert patient
not only reduces ›value deficits‹ (and will probably make 
ethicists expendable) but it is also lauded – for example – by the 
                                             
9  However, there is little known about the actual functioning of 
many patient groups, their inner workings on a membership 
level etc. (Brown 1999).  
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UK Department of Health as a key figure for chronic disease 
management in the 21st century, because his or her truly go-
vernmentalised mind-set promises better compliance and fewer 
expenditures for under-funded health care systems.10 It seems 
only a question of time until the rhetoric of the expert patient, 
the drafted Charters or the pilot projects will eventually 
materialise in more formalised participatory institutions. So is 
democracy progressing? Probably. 
However, there are some open questions, for example: what 
politics of knowledge are set into motion in these initiatives? 
Which assumptions about the epistemic status of the know-
ledge accumulated by patients dominate these policy papers 
that try to restructure the interzone between science/medicine 
and the »public«? How are medicine and the patient redefined 
in this interzonal traffic in knowledge, care, pharmaceutical 
substances and the like? Whereas Vololona Rabeharisoa and 
Michel Callon might envision a growing interpenetration, if not 
integration, of knowledge practices along an epistemic conti-
nuum, British ethicist David Badcott insists on a clear demar-
cation line between science and the life-world and cautions 
against confusing experience with expertise. As he sees it, indi-
vidual patients might possess considerable experience about 
living with their disease, but experience – to quote Badcott – is 
»limited to an individual [and] does not of itself give rise to 
generalizations that underlie reliable clinical treatment« 
(Badcott 2005) and research. This firm separation between 
science, producing reliable truths and certified expertise on the 
one hand and lay experience on the other indeed dominates most 
policy papers suggesting an increased involvement of patients 
into decision processes about health care delivery or research 
strategies. While these policies clearly react to long-standing 
criticisms – not seldom to those of »medicalisation« – and per-
ceived accountability problems of medicine, these initiatives are 
driven by an additive model of knowledge accumulation. Science 
is allowed to be unchanged and objective while the patients add 
the »human element« – insights into suffering, what it means to 
                                             
10  Along the same lines, the German Ministry of Health’s initiative 
»Patient als Partner« envisions the enlightened patient as the 
ideal customer of health care provision (Mißlbeck; Ross 2005). 
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manage a chronic disease on an everyday basis, how to cope 
with stigmatisation or how to cope with conflicting values.  
I have two objections against Badcotts conceptual separation 
of expertise and experience, and I do not think that the additive 
model of knowledge »extension« that rests on this presumption 
helps. First objection: Badcott idealises science as producer of 
objective truths and he misconceptualises experience as not af-
fording generalisations and refinement. Second objection: For 
Badcott and many of the authors of the mentioned policy pa-
pers, the patient is foremost an individual who experiences his 
disease in a radically subjective mode. The patient is rarely con-
ceptualised as a socially embedded actor who is also involved 
in distributed cognitive processes, in reflection and mutual 
learning. For both objections I take my lead from John Dewey’s 
concept of experience. Dewey argues that our current notion of 
experience was shaped by three historic episodes that defined 
experience in relation to reason. In classical Greek thought, 
experience means »the preservation, through memory, of the 
net result of a multiplicity of particular doings and sufferings; a 
preservation that affords positive skill in maintaining further 
practice, and promise of success in new emergencies.« (Dewey 
1997: 199) While there is »some knowledge of materials, me-
thods, and aims […] the marks of its passive, habitual origin are 
indelibly stamped upon it […] it can never aspire beyond 
opinion.« As such, experience contrasts sharply with true, 
universal knowledge. Experience »has to do with production« it 
deals with »generation, becoming, not with finality« (Dewey 
1997: 200). The second historical episode that shaped notions of 
experience centers around the controversies between empiricist 
and rationalist theories of the origin and validation of scientific 
knowledge. Experience here comes to mean – in the words of 
Charles Sanders Pierce – »that which is forced upon a man’s 
recognition will-he, nill-he, and shapes his thoughts to some-
thing quite different from what they naturally would have 
taken« (Peirce 1997: 150). However, mere perception does not 
guarantee scientific knowledge, instead, the data of perception 
have to undergo a qualitative transformation, namely a generali-
sation and idealisation. The third episode problematises ex-
perience as the outcome of »subjective sensations and ideas«. 
Against this subjectivistic experientialism, Dewey stresses that 
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any experience »always carries with it and within it certain 
systematised arrangements, certain classifications« (Dewey 
1997:208), and »[s]ocial institutions, established political cus-
toms, effect and perpetuate modes of […] perception that com-
pel a certain grouping of objects, elements and values« (Dewey 
1997: 209). In short, Dewey suggests something very similar to 
Ludwig Felck’s concept of »styles of thought« (Fleck 1980): 
what might be termed Dewey’s »styles of experience« are 
bound to »communities of practice« (Lave and Wenger 1991) 
and these socially ordered experiences afford reflective thought 
that transcends its experiential basis. 
What is obvious is that this conception is a far cry from the 
above-mentioned clear-cut distinction that demarcates scientific 
fact from subjective experience. The objects of different styles of 
experience are like objects of one style of thought that are at 
least partially translatable into another style of thought. Of 
course, this would presuppose that scientific practices are 
conceptualised as nothing more than dependent upon a specific 
style of experience. The problem, then, is not so much the 
confusion of science and non-science, but rather that the 
reflective potential of everyday experience is not acknowled-
ged. However, an even greater problem emerges when experi-
ence is used as a resource for identity politics that creates a very 
peculiar relationship between experience, culture, collective 
identity, politics, and power (Bernstein 2005). The danger that 
patient movements might run into is that in using »reverse 
affirmations« (Foucault 1981) as a political strategy to gain ac-
cess to political processes, namely to use experiences of stig-
matisation or exclusion based on deviant bodies, they translate 
experience in an unreflective, essentialist way into a means of 
group-formation. This essentialist trap is the dark side of the 
often celebrated »biosociality«, for example in the form of 
»genetic citizenship« (Jennings 2003), a participation entitled by 
biological substance. In these cases, the unintended conse-
quence of participatory politics might be that the reflective 
potential of experience is likely to be bypassed.  
It is somewhat reassuring that many of our respondents see 
using their their bodies as authenticating devices for political or 
social action as an inevitable necessity – as a sort of walking 
proof. A representative example of how patients attempt to in-
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vest their experience in the context of health promotion comes 
from an interview conducted with a 19-year old Cypriot wo-
man who successfully received a bone-marrow transplant:  
»Since I was cured, I wanted to learn more about [the disease]. Two 
weeks ago there was a blood donation in school. A physician came and 
talked about donation and when he finished I spoke to the [300] 
students […] and told them about my problem and urged them to do-
nate blood because […]. I said ›I would like to talk to you. I am a living 
example and I needed blood many times. I never thought that I would 
need blood but I did. Perhaps you may need it in one month’s time, you 
cannot know what will happen‹. I think that I help with my way. I 
worked at the oncology department of the hospital within the context of 
a school working-week and I talked with many parents and they asked 
me many things.« (patient interview11) 
What seems evident from empirical data like those quoted 
above is that the changes in the relationship between citizens 
and their states, that must simultaneously be considered to be 
symptoms and results of changing governmental regimes in 
late modernity, have – as has been already indicated in the 
introduction to this volume – the unintended but often wel-
comed effect of making health care practices and prevention re-
gimes a little bit more reflexive. That patients and citizens 
actively transform themselves from objects to subjects of health 
promotion, that they volunteer to take on responsibility, that 
they organise patient groups and are even actively involved in 
systematic knowledge production, that they begin to see their 
experience in suffering and pain as a valuable resource for 
others, might be seen as hopeful proof for widespread altruistic 
leanings and social coherence. The downside, however, is that 
the increasingly dismantled welfare states and their biomedical 
systems count on the volunteer work of their citizens »to fill the 
gap« between health care and health promotion on the one 
hand and those who need knowledge and care on the other: A 
new type of middle-man citizen is emerging – a knowledgeable, 
self-educated go-between who connects expert regimes of ab-
stract (biomedical) knowledge with non-experts and their need 
                                             
11  This interview was conducted in Nicosia by Costas Constatinou 
(see footnote 1). 
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for substantiated, concrete know-how, in other words, what 
diseases mean in everyday life. Of course, it is open for debate 
whether these investments of experiential knowledge, provided by 
patients and self-trained citizen-experts, their relatives and 
other concerned people, are ever successfully translated into 
biomedical assemblages: do they ever achieve a sustained trans-
formation of health care provision and a significant change in 
the attitudes, styles of thought and practices of health experts, 
or do they remain a welcome but marginal add-on from the 
perspective of biomedicine?  
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